讨价还价模型

运用Rubinstein轮流出价讨价还价模型来构造单一大用户与单一发电公司博弈模型；

Uses Rubinstein Bargain Model to establish a mathematics model of single large user bargain with single generation company ;

罗宾斯泰英建立了一个轮流出价的讨价还价模型。

Ruhinstein set up a bargain model for offer-counteroffer .

本文基于Nash讨价还价模型，引入经济权力概念，扩展了双人讨价还价模型和利益保护机制设计。

The paper introduces the economic power and expands the bargaining model and designs the mechanism of the interest protection based on the Nash bargaining model .

受Nash讨价还价模型的启示，通过对最优解的讨价还价，得到的Nash讨价还价解就是Pareto有效解。

Enlightened by Nash bargaining models , we carry out a bargain over the optimal solution hold that hereby the obtained Nash bargaining solution is the Pareto efficient solution .

在人造环境中，利用博弈论中的Nash均衡和Nash讨价还价模型，研究两个利益冲突的巡线机器人群体通过不同策略获得收益的行为。

In an artificial environment , there are two kinds of line-following robot group , and their benefit is conflicting . Make use of Nash equilibrium and Nash bargaining model , their profit behaviour is research by dissimilar strategy .

在供应链中供需双方分别占主导地位的情况下，通过讨价还价模型，数量折扣策略以及基于合作博弈的JIT批量模型等不同策略方法给出了利益分配策略。

When the buyer or the solder is dominated in the supply chain , we build bargaining model , volume discounts based on cooperation and strategy of the game by JIT to give the ways how to distribute the benefits .

过去几十年中，国内外许多学者对供应链合作策略问题进行了深入研究，并提出了讨价还价模型，数量折扣策略以及基于合作博弈的JIT批量模型等策略方法实现供应链合作。

Over the past few decades , many scholars who studied cooperation strategy on the supply chain issues made bargaining model , quantity discounts strategy and JIT batch models based on cooperation of game theory to achieve cooperation of the supply chain .

最后，采用Rubinstein讨价还价模型来分析系统剩余利润的分配问题，并获得了最优的可行帕累托有效合作新产品研发方案。

Utilizing the Rubinstein bargaining model , we discuss how to distribute the system profit remained and obtain the best feasible Pareto efficient co_op new product R & D project .

为刻画行为主体利益动态均衡过程，论文应用Rubinstein讨价还价模型，揭示公司购并过程中利益均衡及其对公司购并的推动作用。

In order to describe the process of behavioral subject 's dynamic benefit equilibrium , we apply Rubinstein 's offer-counteroffer model to explore the benefit equilibrium and its motive function in the process of M & A.

然后应用Rubinstein讨价还价模型对双方还贷比例进行了分析，并通过算例得出高校承担61.5%、政府承担38.5%是一个较为合理的还贷比例；

The debt proportion that government and university partake by Rubinstein - bargaining model was discussed and a reasonable proportion was got : university assuming about 61.5 % and government about 38.5 % of all by way of illustration .

通过目前企业专利诉讼现状分析及所遇问题进行相关假设，然后建立合作博弈模型分析，得到最优的专利信息检索和防御布局成本投入，最后基于Rubinstein讨价还价模型求出成本分担系数。

By analyzing the current situation of patent litigation to propose some hypotheses and establish a cooperative game model to find the optimal cost investment of patent information retrieval and defense layout . Finally find the cost sharing coefficient by Rubinstein bargaining model .

应用Rubinstein-Stahl轮流出价的讨价还价模型研究了供应链的价值分配和中间产品的定价，从分配的角度探讨如何实现供应链价值分配的合理性。

Value distribution and pricing intermediate product of supply chain are studied in this paper by using Rubinstein _Stahl bargaining model . We discuss how to reach the rationality of value distribution of supply chain .

战略人力资源管理的实现&一个讨价还价模型

The Implementation of Strategic Human Resource Management : a Bargaining Model

让步策略在谈判中的作用：讨价还价模型的一次经济学实验

Function of Concession Behavior in Negotiation : A Experiment in the Bargaining model

讨价还价模型：在企业并购价格谈判中的应用

A Bargain Model : the Application in the Price Negotiations on Enterprise Acquisition and Merger

基于绿色管理的跨国公司与发展中国家讨价还价模型研究

Analyses on Bargaining Model of Green Management Between Multi-national Corporations and Government of the Developing Countries

本文基于开发商与消费者的讨价还价模型，给出一个最优的政府指导价。

Based on the bargaining model on developers and consumers , we give an optimal government guidance price .

本文还分析了讨价还价模型中贴现因子的影响因素，并结合实际节能改造项目给出了模型算例。

Also this thesis analyzed the discount factor of the bargaining model and conducted application research combined with instances .

第四部分探讨了讨价还价模型的理论基础和主要原理。

The fourth part of the paper makes an inquiry into the theory base and main principle of bargain model .

研究了由一个制造商和一个分销商构成的二级供应链上厂商在两种讨价还价模型，即：委托-代理博弈模型和合作博弈模型下的收益。

The payoffs of manufacturer and retailer under two different bargaining game models , principal-agent game and cooperative game , are studied .

分别针对每类协议，应用所建立的讨价还价模型，讨论了不同机器环境、约束及目标下的调度博弈问题。

On the basis of each contract , the bargaining model is used to discuss the scheduling game concerning different machines , constrains and objectives .

接着本文分析战略联盟利益分割问题，建立讨价还价模型，阐述成员企业经过多次“讨价还价”达到一种利益均衡。

Then the paper analyzes the problem of benefit division between stategic alliances , builds the argy-bargy model through which alliance members reach the point of benefit equilibrium .

本文运用讨价还价模型，分析金融业跨国并购中各方的行为策略，探讨了影响并购成败的主要原因，从理论上分析了实际操作中影响并购的因素如何对并购的未来收益分配产生影响。

This article analyzes the tactics of the participant action in the financial cross-border MA and discusses the main reasons which affects the success or failure of the MA , using the bargain model .

论文通过建立连续时间动态讨价还价模型对地方政府与企业所有者之间的博弈关系进行了理论研究，并对双方策略选择关系进行了实证检验。

The paper studies the relationships between the fiscal policies of local governments and firms ' equity financing in China by continuous time dynamic bargaining game model and test the model by statistical data .

纳什讨价还价模型分析表明零售商对供应商的买方势力越显著，零售商在与供应商的谈判中也就处于越有利的地位，批发价格就会越低，反之批发价格越高。

Analysis with Nash bargaining model shows that the more significant buyer power of retailers is , the more favorable position retailers will have when negotiating with suppliers , and the lower wholesale prices will be .

通过利益分配中的讨价还价模型，分别就风险偏好、风险中性和风险规避等三种类型企业，分析了常和博弈中的风险态度和预期收益之间的关系，得出了二者正相关的结论。

Then , the paper probes in detail into the relationship of risk attitude , that is , risk-prefer , risk neutral and risk-averse , and the expected revenue in constant-sum game with the Game-Theoretic model respectively , and comes to the conclusion that they are positively related .

基于双边多目标和时间限制的讨价还价协商模型

Negotiation model of bargaining based on bilateral multi-goal and time constraint

电力市场中关于直购电力价格的讨价还价博弈模型

The Bargain Game Model on Electric Power Price in a Bilateral Electricity Market

对此，经济学家发展了两个理论模型&新古典家庭决策模型和讨价还价家庭模型，并把性别因素考虑进模型中。

Economists have developed the two theoretical models : a model of new classical family decision , and a model of bargain family .

分析结果表明，轮流出价的讨价还价博弈模型可以很好地解决峰谷分时电价的确定问题，加大用户侧的话语权，最终提高电力需求侧管理的水平。

The conclusion shows that the bargain game theory surely can be used to determine the peak and valley lime price , enhance the participation right of demand side and improve DSM level finally .