显性激励

本文提出显性激励和隐性激励两种激励机制。显性激励机制利用契约条款对风险投资家进行激励、约束；

Putting forward explicit incentive mechanism and implicit incentive mechanism ;

一般认为显性激励来源于工资合约，以各种方式把经营者的行为与企业的效益联系在一起。

Usually , explicit incentive is introduced by wage contracts , which connect the behavior of the manager with the performance of the firm .

求解了最优合同，分析了合同的性质。再次，通过一个存在混合策略的博弈模型研究了显性激励和隐性激励对采用PBF合同的基金的风险承担行为的影响。

We get the optimal PBF contract and analyze the property of the optimal contract . Thirdly , this paper study the affect of explicit and implicit incentive on risk taking behavior to the mutual fund with PBF contract though a game model which exits a unique mixed-strategy .

基金经理的激励机制分为显性激励和隐性激励。

This incentive mechanism compose of explicit incentives and implicit incentives .

显性激励和隐性激励对基金风险承担行为的影响

Study on the Effect of Explicit and Implicit Incentive on the Risk Taking Fund Behavior

第四章分析了投资者观测其它相关变量、分阶段投资等显性激励机制对风险投资家的激励作用；

Fourthly , it analyses the inspirit affection ofthe investors'observation about the variable factor and so on .

首先，是对基金经理显性激励的研究，从理论的角度系统地研究了线性激励契约对基金经理行为的影响及其作用。

It studies the action of the linear contract on fund managers ' behavior in the view of theory .

因此建立能切实保护投资者利益的基金管理人显性激励机制在我国基金业发展的初期更显重要。

Therefore , to establish such a mechanism of fund manager explicit incentive seems more important at this primary stage .

本人主要探讨了显性激励的机制，就如何建立合理的薪酬制度和福利体系进行了分析，并建立了合理的模型。

I mainly discusses the mechanism of dominant motivation on how to establish a rational system of remuneration and benefits system .

但是，受制于国有企业显性激励的制度约束，其名义的薪酬收入相当有限。

However , under the system constraints of dominant motivation in state-owned enterprises , the nominal salary income is quite limited .

在内部激励约束机制容易失衡的情况下，经理市场的隐性激励约束效应是对企业内部显性激励约束机制有效的外在补充。

On condition that the inner incentive restraint mechanism is unbalanced , the effectiveness of manager market is an effective complement .

近年来，一部分学者开始对声誉激励进行研究，但是他们没有将显性激励与隐性激励相结合。

In recent years , some scholars began to conduct research on the reputation incentives , but they did not combine explicit and implicit Incentives .

在讨论投资人对投资家的激励机制中，又分显性激励和隐性激励两种模式。

In the discussion of the venture investors ' incentive mechanism for venture capitalists , I point out explicit incentive and implicit incentives two patterns .

本文主要是对企业家人力资本基于主观业绩的隐性激励合同与客观业绩的显性激励合同的组合激励进行的研究。

The paper analyses combinative incentive contract , including implicit incentive contract based on subjective performance and explicit contract based on objective performance to entrepreneur human capital .

短期货币报酬激励是显性激励机制之一。第二，高管人员长期股权报酬激励效应。

The short-term monetary incentive acts as one of the explicit and dominant incentives . Second , the incentive effects of long-term equity ( stock ownership ) for executives .

对声誉这种隐形激励和薪酬显性激励的关系进行的研究，为高管激励提供了新的视角。三是采用了新的研究方法。

The study about the relationship between the explicit and implicit incentives provides a new perspective for top managers ' motivation . Third , the study adopts some new research methods .

声誉在人的行为决策过程中是一个重要的影响因素，对于作为开拓创新的管理者&企业家而言，声誉对其行为的影响尤为重要，甚至可以替代报酬之类的显性激励因素。

Reputation is an important factor that can influence people 's behavior of decision , especially to the entrepreneurs who are creative managers . Reputation may inspire the entrepreneur instead of the obvious factor .

根据经济学激励理论，将代建人的激励机制分为显性激励机制与隐性激励机制两大类，分别从这两个角度展开研究。

On the basis of economic incentive theories , this dissertation grouped the incentive mechanism of the agent into two categories : explicit incentive mechanism and implicit incentive mechanism . The study then developed follow the two perspectives .

文章基于心理学和委托代理理论，探讨了国有企业经营者激励现状，认为国有企业存在显性激励不足、隐性激励有余和负激励缺乏等问题。

Based on Psychology and the theory of Principal-Agent , this paper analyzes the current situation of incentives of Chinese state-owned enterprises ' managers and finds the phenomena of lack of apparent incentives and absence of negative incentives .

在投资人和投资家之间是否可以达到帕累托最优问题的讨论中，通过模型最后导出，在仅有显性激励机制情况下，帕累托最优是不可能达到的。

Whether we can achieves Pareto optimality between venture investors and venture capitalists ? I analyse it through a mathematical model , and I get the answer that only though the explicit incentive mechanism , Pareto optimality can not be reached .

这些现象已经不能用某个单一的理论来解释，如用以产权理论为基础的显性激励方式和以市场竞争为基础的隐性激励方式，都没有找到对经营者激励的满意解。

Such phenomena should not be explained with single theory such as explicit incentive manner based on property rights theory and implicit incentive manner based on market competition because of both theories ' failure in providing satisfactory answers to handler incentive problem .

提出了基于隐性价值的年薪设计、基于绩效的奖金与股权设计、基于隐性需求的非物质性激励组合模式，克服了传统的单一的物质性显性激励的局限性。

So we propose three ways to inspirit TMT & annual salary design based on implicit value , performance-based bonus and stock ownership , and non-material incentive portfolio mode as well , which can overcome shortcomings of traditional single explicit material incentives system .

因此，结合我国国有企业高管人员面临的制度环境，本文着重从以下两个维度（显性激励机制和隐性激励机制）三个方面进行了研究：第一，高管人员短期货币报酬激励效应。

Accordingly , combining with the institutional environment that our SOE executives face , this study focuses on two dimensions ( namely explicit and implicit incentives ) by discussing issues from the following three aspects : First , the incentive effects of short-term monetary rewards for executives .

论文通过以上三方面的研究分析，得出了对国有企业经营者采用带有隐性激励特征的经营者市场激励和显性激励特征的企业剩余分享激励相结合的互补性激励是一种有效的经营者激励机制。

From above three sides the dissertation draw the conclusion that applying mutual replenished incentive combined with the manager market incentive with feature of implicit incentive and incentive of shared surplus claiming rights of enterprises with feature of explicit incentive is the effective incentive mechanism to manager .

设计了最优绩效工资率、等级锦标赛中的最优工资差距以及固定工资为激励手段的最优激励契约&基于报酬的显性综合激励机制；

Designs the optimum explicit incentive contract , which is formed by optimum performance wage rate , optimum gap among individual and the fixed salary ;

但是，由于制度供给不足以及企业内外监管的弱化，导致了我国的经济效率悖论、显性报酬激励悖论和经营者行为扭曲的现象。

However , the insufficiency of institution supply and supervision feebleness inner and outer firms lead to such phenomena as China economic efficiency paradox , explicit pay incentive paradox , and handler behavior distortion .

信贷风险控制中的显性与隐性激励机制分析

Analysis of Explicit and Implicit Incentive Mechanism for Controlling the Credit Risk

创业投资中的显性与隐性激励机制研究

Research on Explicit and Implicit Incentive Contract in Venture Capital

银行实际操作中，显性与隐性激励机制的存在可以减少信贷风险。

In the practice of bank , the existence of explicit and implicit incentive mechanism reduces the credit risk .

显性的报酬激励外，声誉效应会在一定程度上限制风险投资家的机会主义倾向；法规约束、契约安排与治理结构制衡等也有助于减少代理关系产生的道德风险。

In addition of explicit recompense incentive , reputation effect to some degree can limit the agent 's opportunism tendency , institution limitation , contractual arrangement and governance structure also can restrain moral hazard resulted from the principal-agent relationship .