委托代理合同

本委托代理合同自双方签字（或盖章）生效。

The commission contract signed by both parties ( or seal ) entered into force .

在您确定代理人选之后，需要和代理人签订委托代理合同并向其出具授权委托书。

After you decide agent is chosen , need and agent are signed entrust acting contract and issue accredit a power of attorney to its .

委托代理合同的签订也要考虑防止双方机会主义行为引起的代理成本的增加。

Agency by agreement signing of contract is it is it prevents of both sides opportunism agent increase of cost that behavior cause to consider wanting too .

为了避免专业代理人展业中的道德风险，设计了非寿险公司与专业代理人之间的最优委托代理合同。

In the end , an optimal principal agent contract between non-life insurance companies and professional agent is designed to avoid professional agent 's moral hazard in marketing .

论文建立了业主方如何制定委托代理合同以便业主激励咨询方和实施方作出业主期望的努力的博弈模型；建立企业内部上级主管部门，信息部门和业务部门三者之间的博弈模型。

The paper establishes a game model on how to make agency agreement , so that the client can inspire the consultation agency and the engineering agency to make efforts that the client expects . It also establishes a game model among superior departments , information departments and business units .

本文通过建立数学模型研究经纪人过度自信条件下的金融市场最优委托-代理合同。

This paper researches the optimal principal-agent contract of financial market in the presence of overconfident money managers by setting up a mathematical model .

如果金融机构认为经纪人过度自信的可能性比较小，那么金融机构提供的最优委托-代理合同能够同时被理性和过度自信经纪人所接受。

If the financial institution thinks that the probability of money manager being overconfident is very small , the principal-agent contracts offered by the financial institution could be accepted by rational and overconfident money manager .

为有效地将低通货膨胀货币政策实施到位，我们目前最好的策略是实行更加独立的货币政策，设计合理的委托代理激励合同。

In order to effectively bring the low inflation monetary policy into effect , the best measure for us to take at present is a more independent monetary policy , and a reasonable consign-agent incentive contract .

当经纪人的过度自信水平不可观测到时，如果金融机构认为经纪人过度自信的可能性很大，那么金融机构提供的最优委托-代理合同只能被过度自信经纪人接受；

When overconfidence of money manager is not observable , if the financial institution think that the probability of money manager being overconfident is very large , the principal-agent contract offered by the financial institution could be only accepted by overconfident money manager ;

本文讨论了不对称信息下委托代理关系中合同的线性化与线性化的合同。

The paper discusses the linearization of contracts and linear contracts in principal-agent relationships under asymmetric information .

代理人凭自己的实力与委托人谈判，代理合同是双方博弈的均衡结果。

Agent negotiates with the client by his power , and the agent contract is the result of the game equilibrium of the two sides .

第五、六、七章分别就三个案例的特点，抽象出不同的机制，运用博弈论、委托代理和不完全合同等理论对机制进行了分析，总结了三种机制的适用条件。

The fifth , sixth , seventh chapters abstract three different mechanisms according to to the characteristics of each case , and summarizes the applicable conditions of the three mechanisms by analysis of these three mechanisms using game theory , agency theory and incomplete contract theory .

本文主要就委托代理问题的双边机会主义行为进行了分析，在讨论委托代理合同签订的过程中，提出建立完善的监督机制对解决委托代理问题的重要性。

This text the bilateral opportunism behavior on the question of agency by agreement has been analyses mainly , during the process of it is discussed that the agency by agreement signs contracting , propose setting up the perfect importance to solve and entrust problem of agency of supervision mechanism .