隐性激励

求解了最优合同，分析了合同的性质。再次，通过一个存在混合策略的博弈模型研究了显性激励和隐性激励对采用PBF合同的基金的风险承担行为的影响。

We get the optimal PBF contract and analyze the property of the optimal contract . Thirdly , this paper study the affect of explicit and implicit incentive on risk taking behavior to the mutual fund with PBF contract though a game model which exits a unique mixed-strategy .

信贷风险控制中的显性与隐性激励机制分析

Analysis of Explicit and Implicit Incentive Mechanism for Controlling the Credit Risk

基金经理的激励机制分为显性激励和隐性激励。

This incentive mechanism compose of explicit incentives and implicit incentives .

中国企业管理层隐性激励机制研究

A Study of Hidden Incentives in the Management of Chinese Enterprises

本文提出显性激励和隐性激励两种激励机制。显性激励机制利用契约条款对风险投资家进行激励、约束；

Putting forward explicit incentive mechanism and implicit incentive mechanism ;

业绩的隐性激励与经理报酬契约的改进

Implicit Incentives of Accomplishment and Improve Reward Contract of Manager

经理市场的隐性激励约束效应分析及对策

Initial research of the implicit incentive-restraint effectiveness of manager market

高管报酬隐性激励的实证研究

A Positive Research on the Connotative Incentive of Top Executive 's Compensation

创业投资中的显性与隐性激励机制研究

Research on Explicit and Implicit Incentive Contract in Venture Capital

本文着重讨论了隐性激励的其中一种表现形式，声誉效用。

This thesis emphasize the reputation utility as one forms of implicit incentives .

信任、隐性激励与企业知识共享

Credit , Hidden Motivation and Knowledge Sharing of Company

声誉对建筑承包商的隐性激励作用

Reputation 's Implicit Incentive on Construction Contractor

显性激励和隐性激励对基金风险承担行为的影响

Study on the Effect of Explicit and Implicit Incentive on the Risk Taking Fund Behavior

这说明在我国隐性激励（在职消费）确实损害公司价值。

This shows that implicit incentive ( in-service consumption ) indeed damage the value of the company .

银行实际操作中，显性与隐性激励机制的存在可以减少信贷风险。

In the practice of bank , the existence of explicit and implicit incentive mechanism reduces the credit risk .

国有企业内外部隐性激励机制双重缺位是导致国有企业经理人员行为短期化的根本原因。

The " dual absence " is the fundamental cause which leads to managers ' short-time action in state-owned enterprises .

对基金经理而言，业绩排名是重要的隐性激励方式，影响其职业前景。

To fund manager , the performance ranking is the most important implicit incentive method , affects its career foreground .

在内部激励约束机制容易失衡的情况下，经理市场的隐性激励约束效应是对企业内部显性激励约束机制有效的外在补充。

On condition that the inner incentive restraint mechanism is unbalanced , the effectiveness of manager market is an effective complement .

经营者的努力水平不仅来自于显性报酬契约的激励，还来自于两种隐性激励&声誉效应和棘轮效应的影响。

The manager 's effort comes from the explicit incentive and two implicit incentives ( the reputation effect and ratchet effect ) .

公共部门内部劳动市场中的各种非正式制度安排，能够对广大公务员产生隐性激励作用。

Some informal institution arrangement in public sector could have recessive motivation to the public servants in the China 's public sector .

隐性激励来源于经营者对升迁、名誉的考虑，称为“职业生涯考虑”。

And implicit incentive comes from manager 's concern about promotion and reputation , which is usually called " career concern " .

最后引入声誉模型，讨论了利用隐性激励机制解决企业与花农之间道德风险的方法。

Finally the introduction of reputation model , discussed the use of hidden incentive mechanisms to address moral hazard between enterprises and the flower means .

近年来，一部分学者开始对声誉激励进行研究，但是他们没有将显性激励与隐性激励相结合。

In recent years , some scholars began to conduct research on the reputation incentives , but they did not combine explicit and implicit Incentives .

在讨论投资人对投资家的激励机制中，又分显性激励和隐性激励两种模式。

In the discussion of the venture investors ' incentive mechanism for venture capitalists , I point out explicit incentive and implicit incentives two patterns .

从委托代理理论的角度来看，讨论多次重复的委托代理关系条件下的隐性激励机制的作用，应当使用多阶段动态模型。

From the principal-agent theory perspective , multi-stage dynamic model should be used if we discuss the role of implicit incentives under the repeated principal-agent relationship .

本文主要是对企业家人力资本基于主观业绩的隐性激励合同与客观业绩的显性激励合同的组合激励进行的研究。

The paper analyses combinative incentive contract , including implicit incentive contract based on subjective performance and explicit contract based on objective performance to entrepreneur human capital .

本文认为，企业隐性激励是由外部市场竞争性激励和企业内部劳动市场隐含契约性激励共同组成的。

This paper argues that an enterprise 's implicit incentive mechanism consists of competitive incentive from the external market and implicit incentive from its internal labor market .

运用委托代理模型，给出了经理人市场隐性激励机制对节约企业激励成本的定量分析结论。

By using the principal-agent model , this study draws a quantitative analytical conclusion of incentive cost saving through the implicit incentive system of the managerial labor market .

理论上，隐性激励应基于以下几组范畴的整合：预期与信任、文化与制度、获得承认与自我效能感的增强。

Theoretically speaking , the implicit incentive should integrate the following groups : expectation and trust , culture and institutional system , obtaining acknowledgement and strengthening of self-efficacy .

心理契约、声誉隐性激励、柔性激励的研究为我们剖析隐性激励的内涵与特征提供了基础。

Previous researches from the psychological contract , fame implicit incentive and flexible incentive fields could provide us solid basis when analyzing the connotations and features of the implicit incentive .