管理层权力

产品市场竞争与管理层权力之间不存在显著的交互关系。

There is no significant interactive impact between the managerial power and the product market competition .

管理层权力影响管理者的行为方式，并受到内外部各种治理因素的影响。

The managerial power affects the managers ' behaviors , and it is also influenced by various internal and external governance mechanisms .

所以必须高度关注管理层权力，重视在职消费问题。

So we must be highly concerned about the management power and emphasis on non-pecuniary compensation issues in the future .

国有企业的管理层权力与过度投资存在正向关系，管理层权力与投资不足负相关。

There are positive relationship between management power and overinvestment , while the relationship between management power and underinvestment is negative .

本文选取管理层权力和盈余管理两个指标来测度管理者寻租的特征。

Our paper selects two indicators of the management of power and earnings management to measure the characteristics of the manager rent-seeking .

该部分界定了研究对象的相关概念，对委托代理理论、管理层权力理论等理论基础进行了阐述。

In this chapter , the dissertation defines related concepts of research objects , and states the theoretical basis such as agency theory and managerial power approach .

独立董事具有监督、评价和制衡管理层权力的功能，能够降低管理层的代理成本，改善公司的治理结构。

Independent Director has the functions of monitoring , evaluating , and governing the managers , could reduce the agency cost , and balancing corporation 's governance structure .

本章分别从管理层权力、大股东控制和董事会运作三个方面分析了内部治理对高管薪酬制度的影响，并对薪酬机制影响因素进行了实证检验。

This chapter analyzes the impact of internal control system on executive remuneration from three aspects : the management power , large-shareholder control and the board of directors .

在管理层权力较大的公司中，管理者有更多的条件和能力进行寻租活动，借此影响股票期权契约的设计条款以及进行盈余管理、信息操纵等行为影响公司绩效。

In the companies which have larger management power , the managers owner more conditions and ability to do rent-seeking activities , that can influence the design of stock option contracts .

董事会独立性、国有产权性质能够削弱管理层权力对财务舞弊概率的边际影响，表现出显著的替代关系。

The independence of the board and the nature of state-owned property can decrease the marginal effects which managerial power has on the financial fraud , showing a significant alternative relationship .

但由于存在管理层权力、大股东控制、以及董事会弱化等公司治理缺陷，高管薪酬的制定往往偏离公平交易的基础，成为新的代理问题。

However , because of the existence of management power , large-shareholder control , and the board weakness , executive compensation is often deviated from fair value which becomes a new agency problem .

管理层权力论认为现实中独立董事往往本质上是由管理层任命的，因而独立董事愿意做出对管理层有利的薪酬安排。

The management power theory claim that the independent directors are substantively appointed by the management , so the independent directors are grateful to the management and will support management in management remuneration scheme .

因此作为政府或者股权投资者有必要学会识别管理层权力型企业，对高管实施个人利益侵占的企业应该给予相应的监督和市场处罚，从而减轻其负面影响。

Therefore , the government or the equity investors need to learn to identify enterprises with management power , and executives ' personal interests should be given appropriate oversight and market punishment , thereby reduce its negative effects .

本章首先对本文涉及的一些基本概念进行界定，然后对委托代理理论、最优契约理论和管理层权力理论进行详细阐述。

First defining the basic concepts involved in this paper , and then introducing the principal-agent theory , contract theory and management of power theory in detail . Chapter ⅳ: Empirical research on the earnings management and executive compensation .

从总体上来说，管理层权力降低了薪酬差距对公司业绩正向作用，从地区差异上来看，东部地区薪酬差距的激励作用强于中西部地区。

Generally speaking , the management authority to reduce the positive effect of pay disparity on company performance , from regional differences , the incentives of the eastern part of the pay disparity is stronger than the central and western regions .

其二，本文将管理层权力与在职消费相结合，证实了管理层权力提高了上市公司在职消费水平，证明了管理层权力理论在我国的适用性，同时丰富了有关在职消费的研究文献。

Second , this paper combines with the management power and non-pecuniary compensation , and confirms that the power of management improves the level of service consumption of the listed companies , and proves the applicability of the theory of management power in China .

而近些年来兴起的管理层权力理论，指出高管会利用权力影响自身薪酬，甚至以权谋私，使高管薪酬激励本身也成为代理问题的一种。

A new theory the managerial power has been researched in recent years , which indicates that managers would use their power to affect their pay , and abuse power for their personal gains , making compensation incentives itself as one kind of agency problems .

但是，近年来许多文献发现，薪酬激励并不必然解决代理问题，管理层权力有可能使得薪酬决定机制也成为代理问题的一部分。

However , in recent years , a number of literatures have found that executive compensation does not necessarily solve the agency problem . The design and implementation of executive compensation on the basis of managerial power is also considered to become part of agency problem .

众多文献从企业自身特征（如经营风险、管理层权力、治理结构等）的角度出发研究业绩与薪酬之间的关系，但很少考虑外部机构，如证券分析师，对于薪酬-业绩敏感性的影响。

Many papers illustrate how the traits of firms ( e.g. operational risk , power of the managers , governance structure and etc. ) influence the Pay-Performance Sensitivity , but little is known about the role of external constituents ( especially security analysts ) on PPS .

其次，在以往的文献中鲜有对民营上市公司在职消费的研究，本文研究发现，相比国有上市公司，非国有上市公司的管理层权力更大，在职消费程度更高。

Secondly , there are few of research about private listed companies serving consumer in the literature of the past . This study found that compared to the state-owned listed companies , private listed companies have greater power of management and a higher degree of job consumption .

另外，我国上市公司管理层利用权力影响获得的权力薪酬完全是管理层的自利行为，不会起到激励作用。

In addition , executives of Chinese listing corporations utilizing the power to obtain power compensation is Selfish behavior , not to stimulate .

其根源可以追溯到大学教师层的角色冲突、教师层与管理层的权力冲突以及学生对自身权利的诉求。

It resulted from the role conflict of faculties , power conflict between faculties and administrators , and students ' struggle for their own rights .

公司治理的目标是通过以股东为核心的利害相关者对管理层的权力制衡，实现公司整体决策的科学化，因此，有效的监督机制设计十分重要。

It is vitally important for a company to have an effective supervision mechanism because the objective of corporate administration is to make the integrated decision scientific .

掌控公司的市场，已大幅增加了所有者（股东）相对于在任管理层的权力。私人股本是市场的积极贡献者。

The market in control of companies , to which private equity is an active contributor , has greatly increased the power of owners ( shareholders ) over that of incumbent management .

管理层拥有的权力、地位和声誉等因素对管理者的激励作用甚至会远远大于工资、福利等物质因素。

Intangible factors such as power , status and fame of the management provide much greater impetus to managers than some materials factors like wage and welfare .

国王不打算给麦克-马龙在管理层有更多权力，就直接炒掉了他。要知道当考辛斯因为病毒性脑膜炎而住院治疗时，麦克-马龙是他第一个联系的职业教练。

When they weren 't giving him too much power within the organization , they were firing Michael Malone , the first professional coach with whom he connected , while he was in the hospital with viral meningitis .

但本人认为同时在合资企业的权力机构董事会与经营管理机构经理层寻找权力与权利的平衡却并不适宜。

But I do not consider it appropriate to seek power and right balance both in the power institute of a JV , the Board and in the executive institute , the management department .

为了检验管理者寻租对股票期权激励效应的影响，文章基于管理者寻租的视角构建了理论分析框架，从管理层权力和盈余管理两个维度进行了阐述。

To test managers rent-seeking how to impact the incentive effect of stock options , the article based on the perspective of the manager rent-seeking to build the framework of theoretical analysis , and the manager rent-seeking is described by the two dimensions of management power and earning management .