阿罗不可能定理

揭开社会选择的神秘面纱&从阿罗不可能定理到现代福祉经济学

Unveiling Social Choice : from Arrow 's Impossibility Theorem to Modern Welfare Economics

现代福祉经济学在继承和批判阿罗不可能定理的基础上为此提供了一个全面的解答。

The systematic solution to this problem is obtained by modern welfare economics after a complicated groping experience following Arrow 's impossibility theorem .

这是一篇关于效用函数是否存在，及阿罗不可能定理是否成立的研究性论文。

This paper discusses the Logic of Arrow 's Impossibility Theorem .

个人偏好与公共利益的形成&兼论阿罗不可能定理

Individual Need and Forming of Public Interests & Commenting on K.Arrow ′ S Theory

尽管阿马蒂亚·森以个人偏好排序和信息基础对阿罗不可能定理进行了乐观的解答。

However , Sen give an optimistic answer for Arrow Impossibility Theorem through sorting personal preference and information base .

阿罗不可能定理表明，一般情况下，不可能找到一个能同时满足许多显然合理的标准的决策规则。

Arrow 's Impossibility Theorem states that , in general , it is impossible to find a decision-making rule that simultaneously satisfies a number of apparently reasonable criteria .

在第二章中，我们在只考虑个人序数效用，而不考虑个人效用的比较和基数效用的情况下研究社会福利函数，并用拓扑学的方法证明了阿罗不可能定理。

In chapter two , we only consider individual ordering utilities , without considering the interpersonal comparability and cardinality . We use topological methods to study social welfare functions and prove Arrow impossibility theorem .

最后，笔者回顾了学术界近几十年来对阿罗（Arrow）不可能定理的研究，试图放松该定理的公设条件的伦理要求。

Finally , the article review the research for Arrow 's Impossibility Rule in the latest decades and attempts to untie the ethical restrictions of it .