隐性存款保险制度

我国目前隐性存款保险制度已明显不符合市场经济条件下金融稳定和发展的要求。

The implicit deposit insurance system can not meet the demand of financial stability and development under market economy .

本文是围绕从隐性存款保险制度向显性存款保险制度是否可行这个问题展开分析讨论。

This article is from the implicit deposit insurance system around the explicit deposit insurance system to the feasibility of the issues discussed .

中国一直实行的是隐性存款保险制度，迫切需要借鉴美日的经验建立显性的存款保险制度。

China ′ s deposit insurance system is recessive , so China should establish a dominant deposit insurance system like America and Japan .

本文在对我国隐性存款保险制度进行分析的基础上提出了建立适合我国国情的存款保险制度的基本设想。

By analyzing the disadvantages of China 's recessive deposit insurance system , this paper proves the idea of building up a dominant deposit insurance system in China .

有利于促进金融业的对外开放等。计划经济体制下隐性存款保险制度存在着影响公平、影响效率、滋生道德风险等问题。

The invisible deposit insurance system under the planned economic regime gives rise to many problems such as influencing fairness , affecting efficiency , bringing about the moral risks .

同时，在中国隐性存款保险制度的存在的情况下，存款人没有参与银行监管的动机，这使得在资本约束情况下，银行倾向去从事风险更高的投资项目。

At the same time , depositors in China do not have the motivation to participate in the bank supervision , which causes the tendency of banks to engage in riskier investment projects .

我国所谓的“隐性存款保险制度”不是一个公平的、有效的防范银行业风险和提高银行管理水平的制度。

But the so-called " implicit deposit insurance system ", as implied by governmental actions in dealing with distressed banks , is unable to provide a fair and efficient institutional framework to tackle the great risks in China 's banking system .

本文从脆弱的银行体系、金融风险的制度根源、隐性存款保险制度、由开放导入的金融风险等四个方面，给出了中国区域金融稳定的特殊性的理论分析。

This paper carries on the theoretical analysis of the particularity of China regional finance stability from fragile bank system , the system origins of financial risks , insurance system of the recessive deposit , and financial risks channeled into opening .

村镇银行的发展，需要完善村镇银行的市场准入制度，建立隐性存款保险制度，完善农村信贷担保制度，完善农村信用管理体系和建立有效的监管制度。

In order to develop the village banks , we need to improve the market access system , establish the implicit deposit insurance system , improve the rural credit guarantee system , improve the rural credit management system and establish the effective regulatory system .

这种隐性的存款保险制度很容易引起道德风险，各银行可以不用为他们的过度冒险行为而支付额外成本。

This implicit deposit insurance system can easily lead to moral hazard , and the banks can do for their excessive risk-taking behavior to incur additional costs .

从隐性到显性&存款保险制度的变革之路

China 's Deposit Insurance System : From Implicit to Explicit