局中人

jú zhōng rén
  • player
局中人局中人
局中人 [jú zhōng rén]
  • [player] 泛指参与其事、了解内情的人。亦见局内人

局中人[jú zhōng rén]
  1. 在广义Nash均衡中,每一个局中人的策略集已经不是一个与其他局中人所选策略无关的常值集合,而是与其他局中人所取策略有关的一个集值映象。

    Obviously , the generalized Nash equilibrium is the special ease of that . In generalized Nash equilibrium , the strategy set of each player is not a constant set which is independent of the strategy that others choose .

  2. 只有一个判断块的局中人是哑巴或有一个优超另一个的纯策略。

    The player who has only one judgement block either is a dumb or has a dominated pure strategy .

  3. “理性人”是博弈论中的必要的假设前提,即假定博弈局中人都是理性的(rational)。

    The " rational player " assumption , which assumes that the players in game are rational , is a fundamental one in game theory .

  4. 提出了一类局中人都设定有得失控制值的二人零和有限对策,即B矩阵对策。

    A special two-person zero-sum finite game , in which every player has a warning level of the gain and loss , is posed . It is said to be the Matrix B-Game .

  5. 由两个局中人的Neumann-Shannon最优混合策略构成的序对称为Neumann-Shannon对策解。

    An order pair formed by two the payers ' Neumann-Shannon optimal mixed strategies is called Neumann-Shannon game solution .

  6. 支付对策中局中人数目变化的合作对策问题,分别给出了局中人数目变化前后该合作对策的分配、核心、核仁、Shapley值的对应情况。

    The player number varying payment game . Before and after the player number changes , the corresponding case of the imputation , core , nucleolus , Shapley value of the cooperative game are given respectively .

  7. 在最近的一次国际对策论会议上,Shapley教授提出了一种新的谈判集概念。这种谈判集避开了单个局中人之间的谈判,从而对于具有无限多局中人的对策也有意义。

    In a recent international conference on Game Theory , Professor Shapley presented a new bargaining set concept , which avoid bargaining among players , and so can be generalized to the games with infinitely many players .

  8. 针对局中人在合作完成后需要对具体的联盟收益进行分配的情况,文中利用构造的模糊Shapley值隶属函数给出了确定的收益分配方案。

    From the viewpoint that the allocation for each player should be a crisp value rather than a fuzzy membership function at the end of cooperation , we proposed a crisp allocation scheme based on fuzzy Shapley values .

  9. 局中人通过二元互动可以从对策中获得支付。

    Players can obtain payoff from the game through binary interaction .

  10. 具有两类局中人进化对策的进化稳定策略

    The Evolutionary Stable Strategy of Evolutionary Games with Two Types of Players

  11. 局中人数目变化的最小费用支撑树对策问题。

    The player number decreasing minimum cost spanning tree game .

  12. 为局中人进行联盟选择提供了理论依据。

    Therefore , this theory offers a method for players to select their coalitions .

  13. 每个局中人的效用都是自己所选纯策略的一元函数。

    Every player 's utility is a real function of pure strategy he using .

  14. 具有可数个局中人的连续凸对策

    Continuous Convex Games with Countably Many Players

  15. 并且可以方便地通过局中人之间反应函数的性质估计收敛速度。

    This method can estimate convergence speed conveniently according to the reaction function of participators .

  16. 首先对多局中人动态冲突分析理论进行创新研究。

    The theory of multi-player dynamic conflict analysis is studied and summarized in this paper .

  17. 在多局中人静态冲突分析中提出了稳定度的概念,为最终平稳结局的确定提供了依据;

    Stabilization is introduced so the final even conclusion is gotten with multi-player static conflict analysis .

  18. 模拟政治事件时,给软件中的所有局中人输入优质数据的难度很大。

    But feeding software with good data on all the players involved is especially tricky for political matters .

  19. 设做一个矩阵对策的两个局中人都希望对策结果尽可能公平。

    Suppose two players who play a matrix game hope that the game result is as equitable as possible .

  20. 第一阶段通过非参数分位数回归估计局中人的策略与期望支付函数;

    In the first step , the strategy function and expected payoff function are estimated by nonparametric quantile regression .

  21. 证明了在这种解的意义下,非合作的局中人的实际模糊支付值不比它期望的小。

    With such solution , we show that the practical fuzzy payoffs of noncooperative players are not smaller than expected .

  22. 研究了局中人数目允许变动时有边支付合作对策的分配原则问题.就局中人的数目允许变动时的分配问题模型作了一个统一的描述;

    Some problems concerning the distribution principle given by transferable cooperative games with a variable number of players are investigated .

  23. 进化稳定策略能够让局中人,在复杂系统的竞争演化中处于不败之地;

    Theevolutionarilystable strategy can let player , be placed in an invincible position in the competitive evolvement of complex system ;

  24. 其主要结果和结论为:(1)局中人的判断集是局部凸空间;

    The following results and conclusions are made : ( 1 ) the player 's judgement set forms a locally convex space ;

  25. 再者,局中人将成为爱情战争最严重的牺牲品。

    Moreover , the side in-between would be the severest victim in the battle of love , embarrassed in making any perspective choice .

  26. 本文研究了一种局中人具有模糊偏好信息的冲突分析方法可克服上述困难以及局中人判断的模糊性。

    A procedure of conflict analysis with fuzzy preference information is presented and fuzziness in party 's judgement and above difficult are overcome .

  27. 在给定的网络环境中,局中人用节点表示,互动关系连接用社交网络中的边表示。

    In a given network environment , a player is represented by a node and an edge in social networks represents the interaction relationship .

  28. 当两个局中人使用对策解中的策略进行对策时,如果对策结果最公平,那么这个对策解称为最优的。

    A game solution is called optimal if the game result is most equitable when two players use the strategies in the game solution .

  29. 在一定条件下,我们证明随机对策有值函数,两个局中人相对于折扣报酬都有最优策略。

    It is pr - oved that under certain condition the stochastic game has a value and both players have optimal strategies for discounted rewards .

  30. 在合作对策中受到最广泛关注的就是当所有局中人在一起合作时如何分配总联盟的赢得。

    The most extensively concerned problem in cooperative game theory is how to divide the total earnings of the grand coalition if all players cooperate .