贝叶斯纳什均衡

  • 网络bayesian nash equilibrium;bayesian-nash equilibrium
贝叶斯纳什均衡贝叶斯纳什均衡
  1. 不完全信息下贝叶斯纳什均衡的转化

    Transformation of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium under Incomplete Information

  2. 金融挤兑的一种博弈论模型描述与贝叶斯纳什均衡的唯一性

    A Game Theory Model on the Financial Crisis with An Unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

  3. 运用贝叶斯纳什均衡(Bayesian-NashEquilibrium)思想分析了信息共享对公司投资决策的影响。

    The effect on investment decision of information sharing with the thought of Bayesian - Nash equilibrium is analysed .

  4. 移动商务竞价行为的精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡研究

    Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium-based Bargaining Behavior Research in Mobile Commerce

  5. 研究表明,博弈模型存在某种形式的精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡,而且道德风险的存在会使保险单价格上升。

    The research shows that the game model has a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the existing of moral hazard elevates the price of insurance policy .

  6. 最后还将一个贝叶斯博弈模型应用于解释新媒介和传统媒介转换的决策,并得到唯一的贝叶斯纳什均衡。

    At last , we applied a Bayesian game theory model to explain the switch decisions between the old media and the new media , and obtained an unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium .

  7. 接着构建技术型资产供给方与需求方的谈判模型,这谈判是在不完全信息下进行的博弈,最终达到贝叶斯纳什均衡。

    This dissertation designs the negotiation model of the supplier and demander of technological assets . The negotiation is the game under the condition of incomplete information , and reaches Nash equilibrium at last .

  8. 之后把此结果推向一般情况,进一步分析了不完全信息贝叶斯纳什均衡向完全信息纳什均衡转化的条件以及其结论的意义。

    At the last , after put the results to general cases it further analyzes the condition of the transformation from incomplete information Bayesian Nash equilibrium to complete information Nash equilibrium and also explains its practical application .

  9. 第五部分介绍了不完全信息动态博弈的最优均衡&完美贝叶斯纳什均衡。分析了中国股市中一些垃圾股走俏为热门股的现象。

    During the fifth part , we introduce perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium , which is the optimal solution of dynamic game of incomplete information , meanwhile , analyze the reason of an abnormal phenomenon in Chinese Stock Markets .

  10. 摘要针对寻租治理过程中存在的信息不对称性,建立了政府稽查部门和利益集团之间的三个不完全信息动态模型,给出了各自的子博弈精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡。

    In accordance with the information unsymmetry during disposal of rent-seeking , we establish three incomplete information dynamic models involving government inspection departments and groups for profits , and then give their sub-game refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium respectively .

  11. 我们通过一个信号博弈模型分析了可能的完美贝叶斯纳什均衡。初步的研究表明这个信号博弈存在着分离均衡,这意味着在不完全信息的情况下最优保险合同是可以达成的。

    By building a simple signal model , we analyze the possible equilibria , and the elementary study reveals that there exists separate equilibrium ( one of Bayesian refinement equilibrium ) , which means in the presence of incomplete information insurance contract can be reached .