审计合谋

允许或制止审计合谋的最优性分析

An Analysis on the Optimality of Wavering or not Wavering Auditing Collusion

奖励审计师与防范审计合谋

On Preventing the Auditing Collusion by Rewarding the Auditor

在不讲信誉的市场环境中，容易发生审计合谋行为；

In a market without credit , more audit collusion will happen ;

对于审计合谋这一现象，更应该探究其本质。

The audit plot of this phenomenon should look at the nature .

第二章系统地介绍审计合谋产生的外部环境。

In the second chapter , text introduce outside circumstances of captured .

审计合谋的成因及其预防体系构建

The reasons for audit plot and the construction of its prevention system

最后对审计合谋这一现象给出了治理对策。

Finally the paper puts forward some governance countermeasures to the audit collusion .

上市公司审计合谋问题分析

An Analysis on the Auditing Collusion of Listed Companies

审计合谋严重影响了审计的独立性，具有严重的经济后果。

Auditing collusion influences the audit independence seriously , having serious economic consequences .

审计合谋的成因与治理对策

The Cause of Audit Conspiring and Its Governance Countermeasures

审计合谋原因分析及防范治理

Reason Analysis and Governing of Collusion in Audit

审计合谋的特征变量、预警模型及其效果研究

Research on the Significant Variables of Audit Collusion , Prediction Model and Forecast Efficiency

论上市公司审计合谋的成因及对策

Discussions on the Cause and Counter measures of the auditing Conspiracy of listed companies

另外，治理审计合谋还应该加强对大规模上市公司的监控力度。

In addition , it should also strengthen the monitoring efforts of large-scale listed companies .

审计合谋是审计理论和监管界的难题。

Audit conspiring is a difficult question in the audit theory and the supervision circle .

但是近年来发生的财务报告舞弊案例，很多都牵涉到注册会计师的审计合谋问题。

But , many cases of financial statement fraudulent practices involve CPA 's auditing collusion .

审计合谋问题的分析模型

An Analysis Model of Conspiracy in Auditing

审计合谋模型和AM机制

Audit Collusion Model and AM Mechanism

审计合谋成因的博弈浅析

Audit plot origin gambling brief analysis

本文立足于供需角度，分析了审计合谋行为形成及其特点。

Based on supply and demand Mechanism , this paper analyses auditing collusion 's reasons and characteristics .

结果表明，当前的上市公司审计合谋博弈实际嵌套在地方政府官员的晋升博弈之中。

The results show that the audit collusion nested in the local government officials ' political tournaments .

中国上市公司审计合谋的成因及治理：晋升博弈视角的研究

The Cause and Governance of Audit Collusion for Chinese Listed Companies : An Explanation with Promotion Game

上市公司独立审计合谋形成原因及过程审视与应对模式

The Causes , the Process Examining and Response Mode of Independent Audit of Listed Companies to Conspire

基于舞弊特征和审计师选择权的审计合谋治理研究

The Research of Auditing Collusion Government Based on the Characteristics of Corrupt and the Right of Choosing Auditor

审计合谋现象的存在直接影响到证券市场的有效运行，同时也使整个注册会计师行业遭到质疑。

Auditing collusion affects the operation of stock market directly and leads to question on the whole CPA profession .

审计合谋行为指审计机构屈服于客户压力对已经发现的错误或缺陷不作为的行为，本质上是一种市场间的博弈行为。

Audit collusion is a behavior of market game , subjecting to client pressure to neglect the faults found .

由此间接证明无限责任制比有限责任制更有利于防范审计合谋。

It indirectly prove that the infinite responsibility system is more advantageous than the limited responsibility system to restrict the auditing collusion .

审计合谋已成为危害我国审计市场和经济发展的一大顽疾。

The audit plot has become a big rooted problem that harms the audit market and the economic development of our country .

但是控股股东对审计师变更的影响却与本文假设不一致，这说明可能存在审计合谋现象。

However , the controlling owners have an opposite effect to the hypothesis . This may suggests the existence of audit collusion .

要从根本上治理上市公司审计合谋问题，必需结合这种体制背景进行政策上的创新。

To governance the audit collusion fundamentally , we have to carry out Policy innovation combining with the background of this system .