二级价格歧视

随机需求下两寡头二级价格歧视研究

On Second Degree Price Discrimination of Two Oligarchic Enterprises with Stochastic Demand

再者，讨论竞争状态下二级价格歧视均衡解的形式和存在条件时，根据情况使用完全信息动态博弈模型，使得所研究的问题更加实际化。

Thirdly , when we discuss the shape and the existence condition of the equilibrium of second degree price discrimination , we use the dynamic games model full of information to make the problem more practical .

寿险新产品应根据需求差异采取差异化定价法定价。按照不同的价格，直接把同种寿险产品卖给不同的投保人，即二级价格歧视；

The life insurance products should take differential pricing to set down prices .

第二，研究了有市场竞争的厂商二段定价执行二级价格歧视的需求区间分段问题，并将其抽象为一个完全信息静态博弈模型，给出了纳什均衡结果。

The problem of dividing demand intervals of second degree price discrimination of two sectional pricing is studied , which is generalized as a complete static information model . Then the result of Nash equilibrium is given .

其结果有二：第一，分别研究了垄断厂商二段、三段定价执行二级价格歧视的情形，并给出了需求区间的最优分段点；

The results are as the following : 1 . the best division points of demand interval in the case of two stage pricing and three stage pricing are respectively given .