企业道德风险

私营企业道德风险若干问题探究

Research on the Moral Risks of Private Enterprises

法治水平、政府干预等外部治理环境对于企业道德风险的产生作用显著，同时更为重要的是上市公司的经济盈利与公司道德风险的发生具有密切的负相关关系。

External environments factors such as the degree of law and regulations and government interval have remarkable effect on business moral risk .

第一大股东持股比例和第二大股东持股比例差与企业道德风险在5%的显著水平上负相关，也说明了中国的股东制衡效果不佳。

The proportion difference between the biggest and second stockholder is negative correlated to enterprise moral risk in remarkable at the degree of 5 % .

基于这一框架，我们分析了影响企业道德风险和银行核查力度的微观决定因素以及银行控制企业道德风险的随机监督策略。

Based on the framework , we investigated the determinant factors in moral hazards and verification extent , and analyzed monitoring strategies of bank as well .

企业道德风险的不确定性是由于企业人员和环境的不确定性，这便要求必须在不确定性中造就一种确定性，因此规避企业道德风险必须要走职业化之路。

The uncertain of the moral risk is because of the uncertain of the employees and environment . So , risk avoiding should take the way of professionalization .

但重复博弈时声誉效应会起到积极作用，对联盟中的企业道德风险行为产生有效约束。

However , when the game is repeated , reputation effect will play an active role and bring effective constraint on the moral hazard of enterprise in the alliance .

从道德风险的外生源和内生源两个视角探讨影响企业道德风险的因素并加以实证分析，这里体现出本文对企业道德风险的全面系统考察。

Exploring factors which affecting business moral risk from two perspectives , namely external source and interior source , then make a positive proofing . It manifests the systematic inspection of this research .

国有企业经营者道德风险防范问题研究

Studies on Prevention of Moral Hazard about State-owned Enterprises ' Managers

要规避企业中道德风险就需要重新确立人的契约意识。

New consciousness of contract should be reset for avoiding enterprise moral risk .

风险企业的道德风险与控制权配置的模型分析

A Model Analysis of Moral Hazard and the Allocation of Control Rights in the Venture Capital Backed Companies

论道德风险与道德创生国有企业经营者道德风险：深层导因及对策研究

The Moral Hazard of Managers in State-Run Enterprises : A Study of of Its Deep Causes and Countermeasures

第一部分讨论了证券市场上信息不对称问题所导致的逆向选择、企业经营者道德风险和市场失灵。

Part one discusses the Information Asymmetry and its consequences : Adverse Selection , Moral Hazard and Market Failure .

这些缺陷造成了中国企业的道德风险、逃废债。

Furthermore , these factors induce the moral hazard of Chinese enterprises , whichever state-owned enterprises ( SOEs ) are or not .

并从国有资产管理角度提出了防范中央企业经营者道德风险行为的公共政策建议。

And from the perspective of state-owned assets management , it puts up public policy recommendations to prevent central enterprises managers from moral hazard behavior .

它们相应产生了财政系统的道德风险、金融机构的道德风险、国有企业的道德风险。

So they produce the moral hazards of public finance system , the moral hazards of financial institutions and the moral hazards of state-owned enterprises .

企业营销道德风险是一种复杂的社会经济现象，对其形成机理的研究是有效控制企业脆弱性的基础。

Enterprise marketing moral hazard is a complex socioeconomic phenomenon ; the study of its formation mechanism is the basis of effectively controlling enterprise vulnerability .

契约设计是防范供应链信任危机的制度基础，其目的在于抑制企业的道德风险，促使企业产生可信行为。

The institutional basis of preventing trust crises of the supply chain is the design of the contract . And the contract design aimed to inhibit enterprises from moral hazard and promote a credible business conduct .

企业中道德风险的产生有四个条件：一是利益主体的不一致；二是信息的不对称性；三是现实情况的不确定性；四是契约的不完备性。

There are four circumstances for the causation of the enterprise moral risk : Firstly , the profit subject is not unanimous . Secondly , the information is not complement . Thirdly , the confronting problems are uncertain .

阿尔奇安和德姆塞茨关于团队生产的理论，对解决企业内部由于道德风险所引致的效率低下问题具有一定的启发意义。

Alchian and Demsetz 's team production theory is beneficial to solving the inefficiency problem derived from moral hazards within enterprises .

在信息不对称情况下，政策性负担将导致国有企业经理的道德风险，从而导致国有企业的低效率；

We find that under information asymmetry , policy burdens will lead to the moral hazards of the SOE managers and hence the low efficiency of SOEs ;

若两个企业经营者的道德风险程度相同，则风险厌恶程度高的经营者持股比例较小。

Or if moral hazard of two managers ' holding shares are the same , the one whose risk-aversion is higher has less proportion of holding shares .

第三部分是关于中央企业建立经营者道德风险预警管理机制的论述，是论文的主体内容，由第六章、第七章组成。

It is the main content of the paper . The sixth chapter discusses the objectives , principles and methods of the establishment of moral hazard early-warning mechanism for the central enterprises managers .

指出，企业经营者的道德风险程度及其持股比例对企业负债率的影响程度与经营者的风险厌恶程度间有密切的联系。

We point out that the strength of the influence of the degree of the firm 's manager 's moral hazard and the proportion of the manager 's holding shares on the debt-equity ratio relates to the degree of the manager 's risk-aversion .

我国企业会计行为中道德风险的治理途径

Ways to Administer Moral Hazard in Accounting Behavior of Chinese Enterprises

国有企业债转股的道德风险及防范措施

Moral Risks in State Enterprises ' Debt-in-lieu-of Equity and its Countermeasures

创业企业中的双边道德风险与最优融资合约

Double Moral Hazard in a New Venture and Optimal Financial Contract

基于机制设计理论的企业技术委托开发道德风险防范研究

On Moral Hazard Prevention of Commissioned Technological Development Based on Incentive Mechanism Design Theory

股份制企业经营中的道德风险

Management Ethical Risk of Share Holding Companies

进一步完善激励合约，规避企业管理者的道德风险。

On the other hand , corporations need to improve the incentive contract to avoid moral hazard .

最后引入声誉模型，讨论了利用隐性激励机制解决企业与花农之间道德风险的方法。

Finally the introduction of reputation model , discussed the use of hidden incentive mechanisms to address moral hazard between enterprises and the flower means .