克里普克

克里普克在《维特根斯坦论规则和私人语言》一书中，给出了一个怀疑论论证，得出没有事实表明我们用语词意谓什么的怀疑论结论。

In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language , Saul Kripke presents a skeptical argument for the paradoxical conclusion that there are no facts about what we mean by our words .

论克里普克的先验偶然命题和后验必然命题

On kripke 's priori , contingent and posteriori , necessary propositions

逻辑悖论与自我指称&兼评克里普克的逻辑悖论思想

Logical Paradoxes and Self-reference & on Kripke 's thoughts of logical paradoxes

语言与世界：对克里普克的后天必然真理的一个解释

Language and World : an Explanation of Kripke 's A Posteriori Necessary Truth

，而克里普克也是从这里开始了他对私人语言的解读。

And Kripke also started his own interpretation of private language from this point .

必然性是《命名与必然性》的理论内核，借助可能世界，克里普克对必然性进行了语义分析，从而创立了可能世界语义学。

Kripke gives a semantical analysis to necessity , and establishes semantics of possible world .

克里普克《命名与必然性》研究

On Kripke 's Naming and Necessity

自然种类名称与严格性&克里普克通名理论的一个疑点

Natural Kind Names and Rigidity & A Doubtful Point in Kripke 's Theory of General Names

克里普克的逻辑悖论研究

Kripke 's Research on Logical Paradox

黑格尔以及现代的克里普克等人都从不同程度上发展了本质主义。

Hegel and modern Kripke , Putnam and others have developed the essentialism on certain degrees .

其次，在可能世界的基础上克里普克提出了严格指示词理论。

On the basis of possible worlds , Kripke puts forward the " strict instructions to the word " theory .

经过克里普克对维特根斯坦的文本解读和发挥，遵行规则的问题成为一个当代西方哲学界热点讨论的话题。

Since Kripke 's reading and explaining , the question about Rule-Following has been a hot topic of western philosophy recently .

因果描述理论并没有能够对克里普克的语义论证进行有力的辩护。

This paper analyse their arguments , and point out the causal description theory can 't withstand the Kripke 's semantical argument .

克里普克和普特南这两位哲学家是在相对独立的环境下，提出了相似的因果指称理论。

Kripke and Putnam that the two philosophers is relatively independent of the environment , made similar allegations of cause and effect theory .

略评克里普克、古普塔的说谎者悖论&语境作弄与复合命题解悖方案

Some Comments on Kripke and Gupta 's " Liar Paradox " & Unfavorable " Context " and Its " Complex Proposition " Resolution

第二部分：详细分析了两种主要的关于名称的指称理论：以罗素为代表的摹状词理论和以克里普克的历史因果的指称理论。

The second part analyzes two important reference theory concerning name : Description Theory represented by Russell and Historical Casual Theory of Reference represented by Kripke .

亚里士多德从本体论和认识论方面都对事物本质进行了论述，而克里普克的本质主义更侧重于认识论的论述。

Aristotle debated the essence of matter by using the viewpoint of ontology and epistemology . However Kripke debated the essence from the viewpoint of epistemology .

克里普克的其他思想，如历史因果命名理论、本质理论无不与这种必然观密切相关。

Kripke 's other thoughts , for example , the theory of naming and the theory of essence , have close relation to this kind of inevitability .

当然，蒯因和克里普克观点的提出是分析哲学发展中的重要的里程碑，极大地推动了分析哲学在当代的发展。

Nevertheless , the viewpoints of Quine and Kripke were important milestones in the history of analytical philosophy , which bring about a great advance in contemporary analytical philosophy .

克里普克持温和实在论的观点，认为可能世界是现实世界的可能状态（或历史），或非真实的情形。

Kripke is a moderate realist , who considers ' possible worlds ' as ' possible state ( or history ) of the world ', or ' counterfactual situation ' .

克里普克举出“间接自涉”例子表明：只有遭受不利的语境“作弄”，语句才沦为“悖论”的；

Kripke gave an ( indirect " self-reference ") example to show : our ordinary assertions are liable to exhibit paradoxes , if the " context " is extremely unfavorable .

克里普克为了批判弗雷格和罗素的名称摹状词理论提出了三类论证，即模态论证、认识论的论证和语义的论证。

For the sake of criticizing Frege and Russell 's theory of description of names , Kripke gave three kinds of demonstration , namely model arguments , epistemological arguments and semantic arguments .

一些人认为，唐纳兰关于限定摹状词的两种用法，即归属性用法和指称性用法的观点在一定程度上能够避免克里普克的语义的论证和模态论证。

Some people claim that , to some extent , Kripke 's semantic arguments and model arguments can be avoided based on Donnellan 's viewpoints on the referential and attributive use of definite descriptions .

跨世界同一性和跨界识别问题是与可能世界相关的问题，在克里普克看来，作为严格指示词的名称就是识别跨界个体的标签。

The problems of cross-world identity or cross-world identification have something to do with the possible worlds . According to Kripke , name is rigid designator , which is a label to discriminate the cross-world individual .

二是因为克里普克所谈到的自然种类名称属于不同的语法和语义类型，如此复杂的情形不能像专名那样一概而论。

For another thing , Kripke 's natural kind names belong to different syntax and semantic types , and it is not appropriate to put all of them into one model just like that of proper names .

克里普克对维特根斯坦的解读主要是认为意义规范性使得遵守规则成为可能，不过我们将从语言游戏的规则使得词的使用（意义）成为可能这一角度研究二者之间的关系。

Kripke suggests that normative meaning makes rule-following possible . However , we will discuss the relation between rule and meaning in the perspective that rules in language-game make the uses of words , namely meaning possible .

克里普克对先验偶然命题的和后验必然命题的论证与他的理论体系是融贯一致的，但他对严格指示词的证明是不充分的。

Kripke 's demonstration on the priori and contingent propositions and the posteriori and necessary propositions is consistent with his system of theory , but we think the demonstration is inadequate that he made for the rigidly designating terms .

文章认为，自然种类确实有自己的本质，即它的成员共有的内部结构，支持克里普克、普特南的这一观点，并对它做了充分的辩护。

The dissertation holds that natural kind has its essence indeed , that is , the internal structure all its members share , supports the above opinion of Kripke and Putnam , and gives a strong justification for it .